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DOLLARS, ‘FREE TRADE,’ AND MIGRATION: 
THE COMBINED FORCES OF ALIENATION IN POSTWAR EL SALVADOR 
 
ABSTRACT 
Driven by new conditions of desperation and alienation, mass migration in postwar El 
Salvador has continued unabated.  While this migration could be seen as a way of “opting 
out” of on-going class struggle, we argue that it instead represents a critical dissipation of 
class relations and struggle.  In the postwar context, the ruling class and the Salvadoran state 
now seek to capitalize upon the alienation of its own people and responses to that alienation – 
i.e., upon migration and the remittances it generates.  The ruling class has ensured its 
economic domination regardless of who controls the state.  Seeking to legitimize and 
maximize seizures of citizens’ income as it flows across borders as a matter of “economic” 
and “development” policy, the ruling class has depleted the productive base through which 
class struggle would ordinarily occur, creating new forces of alienation in El Salvador and 
extending the need for many Salvadorans to migrate.  
INTRODUCTION 
In The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx noted that we “make [our] own history, but… not… 
just as [we] please; [we] do not make it under circumstances chosen by [our]selves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past” (2000 [1852]: 329).  In 
The German Ideology, he and Engels emphasized: “the first premise of all human existence and, 
therefore, of all history, [is]… that [people] must be in a position to live in order to be able to 
‘make history’” (1998 [1845]: 47).   
If we take these two simple yet profound points and turn them to an analysis of life in El 
Salvador, what, specifically, are the “circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted 
from the past” which, in turn, affect the Salvadoran people’s ability to “live” and “make their 
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own history”?  Our answer, in brief, is that, the ruling class’ recent dismantling of traditional 
class relations and its emergence as a transnational “finance aristocracy” generates new forms of 
“alienation” or “estrangement” for the poor which fuel, and are fueled by, mass emigration:  
These conditions greatly complicate the domestic “class situation” and possibilities for “class 
struggle.” However, by specifying this new “national reality” in El Salvador (Ellacuría, 1991), 
we aim to highlight key obstacles to, as well as mechanisms for, change. 
Participants and supporters of the insurgency during the civil war often saw their efforts 
in terms of “making their own history” (Wood, 2003).  However, changes wrought by the war 
and economic restructuring have steadily undermined the conditions that sustain “life,” the “first 
premise” of “history making.” This fundamental form of alienation both drives and is 
perpetuated by migration. In what follows, we analyze how these changes relate to the 
dollarization of the Salvadoran economy and the implementation of so-called free trade 
agreements (including the rhetoric versus reality of maquilas), as well as constraints on domestic 
production.  Although several studies examine particular aspects of these processes (e.g., 
Gammage, 2006; Madrid, 2009; Anner, 2011; Almeida, 2008; Towers and Borzutzky, 2004), this 
is the first study, to our knowledge, that examines the relationship between all of them in El 
Salvador, as well as the connection between these deeply intertwined processes as a whole and 
alienation more generally. In closing, we discuss the implications of our argument and 
tentatively explore what might be done to restore the capacity for “making life” and thus 
“history” within El Salvador.   
Our analysis is based on both primary and secondary data.  Primary data were collected 
mainly in two towns in El Salvador – Yucuaiquín and Masahuat – with similar histories of 
migration, but different historical patterns of land tenure (the primary “means of production” 
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prior to the war, and the basis for the traditional “relations of production” that broke down during 
the war and in its wake).  Research in El Salvador yielded 102 interviews and hundreds of hours 
of observational field notes.ii Research in the U.S. with migrants from Yucuaiquín and Masahuat 
yielded an additional 16 interviews. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
CONTEXT  
Outwardly, Yucuaiquín is a charming, colorful town that sits on a mountain peak and 
overlooks San Miguel, the city and volcano.  Youth are stylishly dressed, the elderly impeccably 
so.  The cobblestone streets are clean and wide; the neighborhoods long and winding.  Wired 
megaphones mounted to telephone poles broadcast Catholic mass and public announcements.  
School children wearing dark blue and white school uniforms gather in the parque central, or 
central park. Mud or cane-stalk homes are interspersed with cinderblock houses, many of two 
stories, painted bright greens, reds, yellows, and blues.  On the outer walls of every fourth or 
fifth home, signs advertising sodas, calling cards, and shaving razors indicate a small store 
within.  Young girls and middle-aged women walk through town carrying baskets full of 
tortillas, totopostes,iii or ice cream for sale.   
Upon first glance, Masahuat is similar.  Arriving by bus or car, the visitor is immediately 
greeted by gold lettering on the mayor’s office in the center of town.  Brightly painted with tinted 
windows and air conditioning, it gives the feel of a tax-rich facility.  Despite a few broken street 
lamps, the parque central is inviting and clean.  Most houses are made of cinderblock, but only a 
few are two stories, and they are much smaller and more crammed together than in Yucuaiquín. 
Large cattle pastures and small milpas, or patches of corn and sorghum, pepper the hills 
surrounding the neighborhoods. A river circumscribes three-quarters of the town.  
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Migrant remittances have affected these towns in clear ways, particularly when compared 
with towns where weathered mud, tin, or thatch homes containing the barest essentials 
predominate, as they did until recently in Yucuaiquín and Masahuat, and still do in many towns 
lacking remittances. But such a narrative of what seems like readily apparent wealth or 
wellbeing, while true to a limited degree, hides other realities (see also Pedersen 2004). 
Within their homes, Yucuaiquenses and Masahueños reveal deep anxieties over such 
basic concerns as insufficient food and water.   They complain about high (privatized) electric 
and water bills, and the infrequency of service.  They worry about how to feed their families on 
combined, familial incomes of a few dollars a day, especially when some has to be set aside for 
other bills.  In Yucuaiquín, food is expensive.  It comes from the city of San Miguel and parts 
beyond.  The high price of fuel and inflated costs with dollarization mean they will spend several 
dollars per day to eat.  In Masahuat, residents rely on their own produce for basic grains to make 
tortillas and pupusas,iv but when their harvests fail—as they often do—they too have to buy 
grains, as well as meats and vegetables, from markets in Metapán, a city about twenty-five miles 
away.  A health problem for a family member in either community can spell long-term financial 
trouble. This is despite the great assistance that remittances provide.  
Residents of both communities express despair over declining local sources of 
production—whether in agriculture or industry—and the alienation this creates.  For them, post-
war economic restructuring, including liberalization and dollarization, both necessitates and 
combines with migration to deepen their sense of alienation: 
Martín (Yucuaiquín): If in El Salvador we produced, maybe we could [stand on our  
own]… There are poor people everywhere—across the globe.  But here there are more.  So 
while people continue living in cardboard houses, in the suburbs, while people are living in 
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tin shacks that look like microwave ovens, [migration] is not going to stop… Leaving...was 
never my priority because I got by, but now I look around and I think, we’re screwed. 
Antonio (Masahuat): There are factories here [in El Salvador], but they’re not from here.  
The foreigner always has one idea more.  And as the governments allow other countries to 
come and take for themselves, agriculture will fail here.  Before, one sold his harvest well.  
The dollar wasn’t here.  The dollar robs the farmer of all his merit… In the end, they’ll all 
[migrate].  On that alone they live…They don’t have anything else. 
Roxana (Masahuat): There are some people here who don’t have anywhere [to go], not even 
anything to eat!  And from there they get really hopeless and they find a way to get some 
money so that the [migrant smugglers] will take them [to the U.S.].  It’s really hard… If there 
was a place to earn at least a daily wage, we would be happy.  Because we would say, 
púchica, I have my job, I’m going to eat! But without work, and with nothing, one says…I’m 
going to suck in my stomach. To drink water!  At least, thank God, we aren’t short on water 
[in Yucuaiquín, water shortages are the norm]. 
Salvador (Yucuaiquín): Now there really isn’t any way to earn an income… Based on all of 
the land that people used to farm, if the government provided incentives to get projects 
going, to encourage people so that we wouldn’t have to import cabbage, tomato—we’re 
importing vegetables when we could be cultivating them here!...  But, we could develop 
programs to farm.  Citrus.  Lemon.  Orange.  Oranges grow really well here. Maybe even 
avocado.  The government should think about that—if there were only programs!  Or even 
loans so that we could develop that kind of farming. 
OVERVIEW 
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From 1980 to 1992, a bloody and prolonged civil war – in many ways a “class war” – 
was fought over extremely unequal access to the means of production and oppressive working 
conditions.  It was thus fought over that “first premise” of “all history,” the conditions which 
make “life” possible.  As a fundamental means of production and sustenance, access to “land” in 
particular was extremely unequal, with most land controlled by a small but powerful landowning 
oligarchy (Dunkerley, 1988; Paige, 1997; Wood, 2003).  For the bulk of the nation’s population, 
such inequality meant that the conditions of “life,” prior to the war, were rather tenuous. 
The war and the Salvadoran state’s attempts at economic restructuring both during and in 
its wake only increased this tenuousness.  War made life in the countryside especially difficult.  
Many landowners fled to the city or abroad, and land was either abandoned or military forces 
violently contested its control (Wood, 2003).  Agricultural production for the market declined 
significantly (Dunkerley, 1988), stimulating the construction of national “food import 
infrastructure and distribution systems” that the state then used to suppress food prices in an 
effort to calm urban political unrest (Hecht et al., 2005: 316).  However, by lowering food prices 
through increased imports, state policy further suppressed domestic grain production and thus 
limited rural options for “living” – such constraints persisted even after the civil war came to a 
close.  Grain prices today stand at 27 percent of their 1978 value, and although 90 percent of all 
Salvadoran households produce grains, only 5 percent of their income is derived through grain 
sales (Hecht et al., 2005: 316). Even profit-driven export crops such as coffee, which once 
dominated the Salvadoran economy, have fallen by the wayside as the Salvadoran state shifted 
its economic policies and resources away from agriculture to finance and industry, changes that 
hardly compensate for the lost employment in the nation’s agricultural regions.  
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Under these conditions, an estimated 25 percent of the Salvadoran population has 
emigrated, and, nationwide, 22 percent of those who remain receive remittances on a regular 
basis. On average, households receiving remittances rely on them to cover 84 percent of their 
total expenditures (UNDP, 2005: 30-31).  In localities such as Yucuaiquín and Masahuat, the 
percentages are much higher (here, approximately 40 percent of households receive remittances 
on a regular basis and nearly two thirds have at least one relative living abroad).  Indicative of 
how profound a change this is, the main source of El Salvador’s national foreign exchange 
shifted over the past 30 years or so from agro exports (81 percent of foreign exchange earnings 
in 1978 vs. a mere 5 percent in 2004) to migrant remittances (only 5 percent of foreign exchange 
earnings in 1978 vs. 70 percent in 2004) (UNDP, 2005: 7). 
In one sense, migration could be seen as a way of “opting out” of the class struggle by 
leaving the country (Hirschman, 1970).  However, in another sense, a new form of exploitation, 
and thus a new, but more indirect and “mystified” class relationship, has emerged via a vicious 
cycle in which the ruling class and the Salvadoran state now seek to “capitalize” upon the 
alienation of its own people and their primary response to that alienation; that is, upon migration 
and the remittances it generates. We depict these relationships in Figure 2, below, and explain 
their connections and consequences in what follows. 
Figure 2 About Here 
Remittances deposited in national banks, privatized in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
provided foreign exchange reserves that enabled the elite to seek international loans from the 
IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank (Segovia, 2002).v  Largely through 
their control of the state, the ruling class divorced themselves from the land and privatized 
services, including telecommunications and transportation, which Salvadorans increasingly 
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consumed using remittances, or income their relatives earned abroad.  Having achieved 
privatization through structural adjustment, elites then sold interests to actors in the U.S., Asia, 
Central, and South America (Segovia, 2005).  Dollarizing the economy in 2001 and ratifying 
CAFTA in 2004 accelerated these processes, as the real thrust of these policies is to facilitate the 
transnationalization of Salvadoran capital while simultaneously facilitating international 
investment in El Salvador’s financial and services sectors (Segovia, 2005; Madrid, 2009).  At the 
same time, such maneuvers undermine domestic agriculture, where most Salvadorans have been 
employed, without providing commensurate jobs in industry.  By 2007, finance was the largest 
and most dynamic economic sector in El Salvador, followed by transport, warehouse, and 
communications (Madrid, 2009: 200).vi  Limited domestic production exacerbates both under-
employment and un-employment:  Nearly one third (32 percent) of the national labor force is 
under-employed, while almost half (49.8 percent) of the jobs in the urban sector are unpaid (e.g., 
people who work in their relatives’ retail establishments without being compensated) (National 
Directorate of Statistics and Census (DIGESTYC), 2008).  The informal proletariat in El 
Salvador, which signifies the erosion of steady class relations, is larger than in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela (Portes and Hoffman, 2003: 52).  
Elite interests are thus based on the relative absence of productive relations in El 
Salvador and the resulting migration and remittances such conditions perpetuate.  This change 
marks the emergence of a “transnational capitalist class” (Madrid, 2009; Robinson, 2003), which 
bears striking resemblances to what Marx, in The 18th Brumaire, called a “finance aristocracy” – 
that is, a “parasitic” faction of the capitalist class with direct interest in the indebtedness and 
bankruptcy of the nation – or, more exactly, the nation’s people.  For this emerging transnational 
capitalist class, the country has become merely a node in the regional and global economy that 
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they can exploit by channeling global flows of money and capital, including remittances 
(Madrid, 2009; Segovia, 2002), and the cheap labor supplied by the marginalized, “surplus” 
population (Robinson, 2003).  When this node has been “sucked dry” (recall Marx’s repeated 
depiction of capitalists as “vampires”), they are ready to move on to another node (e.g., the 
massive amounts of capital withdrawn from the country during the war and the more recent 
expansion of private banks into the U.S. and other Central American countries (Wood, 2003; 
Segovia, 2002)).  
We employ the basic premises of Marx’s approach to uncover how, rather than being “El 
Salvador’s newest and most important ‘export’” (Gammage, 2006: 75; see also Taylor, 1999), 
migrants instead produce and “export” themselves due to conditions of alienation, domestic 
uncertainty, and desperation – and as Gammage (2006) herself notes, typically at great cost to 
themselves and their families.  Though scholars such as Gammage (2006) concede that migration 
constitutes an unsustainable and self-defeating development strategy, their language suggests 
that it is the state or some form of organized enterprise that “exports people” and subsequently 
imports remittances as a form of revenue or profit.  Migrants themselves, as opposed to their 
capacity to labor, are thus equated with “commodities” (typically produced and distributed in an 
organized and directed way).  However, neither migration, nor the sales of migrant labor power 
that generate remittances, nor the decisions to remit are organized or distributed in any 
systematic or directed way (see also Hernández and Coutin, 2006).  The “value” represented by 
remittances themselves is generated not by “surplus” labor (as when Salvadorans working in 
maquilas generate “value” far in excess of their wages), but rather by “necessary labor,” which is 
the labor required to ensure their own and their families’ survival.  This means that while 
capitalists in countries of immigration capture extra surplus labor and value from migrant labor 
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by paying sub-standard wages, capitalists in El Salvador also profit, both directly and indirectly 
from remittances, or the sums of money which poor migrants have set aside out of their own 
“wages” (“necessary labor”) to help support family members back home.  As Robinson 
(2003:273-4) notes, “the new transnational migration helps capital dispose with the need to pay 
for the reproduction of labor power” since “the site of labor power and its reproduction have 
been transnationally dispersed” (ibid: 208).  However, in El Salvador the possibilities for such 
“reproduction” have been undermined by the very restructuring that the presence of remittance 
“dollars” originally helped finance: The decline of agricultural production makes it much harder 
for many Salvadorans to survive without further remittances.  Given this new “transnational 
reality,” successive generations of Salvadorans will need to migrate as their alienation from the 
fundamental conditions of “life” and “making history” deepens at home.   
ALIENATION AND MIGRATION 
“Alienation” or “estrangement” means that one’s “existence” contradicts their “essence” 
(Hunt, 1982).  For Marx, the capacity for “free, conscious activity” is the defining characteristic 
of the human species (1974: 328).  However, this capacity is only possible by virtue of the fact 
that we are fundamentally “social” beings (Marx clearly viewed “thought” as, from the 
beginning, a “social product”), whose decisions and actions are also driven by our “passions” or 
“emotions” (2000 [1845-6]: 183, 1974: 390); co-author, in press).  It is only because of this that 
we, as human beings, are in a position to “make our own history.”  Anything, therefore, that 
stands in the way of our human capacity for “free, conscious activity,” our “social nature,” and 
the human “passions” that drive history making, is a source of “alienation” or “estrangement.”  
Moreover, any obstacles to realizing that “first premise of all history” – the presence of life 
sustaining or supporting conditions – stand at the very root of “estrangement.”  Alienation from 
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the conditions necessary for “life” itself thus supersedes all other forms of alienation, including 
those in the wage-labor process – most closely associated with Marx’s theory of alienation.   
The enormity of Salvadoran emigration migration reflects – quite literally – a 
fundamental alienation of many Salvadorans from their own ability to sustain “life” and “make 
history” at home, and therefore from their own society and state. Despite somewhat greater 
access to land in the postwar context, within the broader political economy of El Salvador today, 
most Salvadorans are unable to use it as a life sustaining “means of production,” as they might 
have been in the pre-war, pre-neoliberal era. National economic reform, including the 
liberalization of agriculture through CAFTA (see below), subjects Salvadoran farmers (50 
percent of the population works in agriculture) to widely fluctuating and often depressed prices 
for their grains and crops, while the costs of fertilizers and pesticides, increasingly necessary to 
maximize production for all farmers, have risen (Hecht et al., 2005; Acevedo, Barry and Rosa, 
1995: 2157).  This is due, in part, to the Cristiani and Calderon Sol administrations’ reduction of 
domestic tariffs on agriculture from 230 percent to 15 percent, and Cristiani’s closing of the 
Institute of Regulatory Supplies, which previously bought basic grains at prices above market 
value to sell abroad, thus guaranteeing prices for domestic producers (Madrid, 2009: 199). In 
contrast, today the Salvadoran state allows surplus grains from the U.S. to flood its markets. As a 
result: 
Mauricio: Agriculture is through the floor...  If you use fertilizer, your crop will grow but you 
won’t break even… People invest 3000 colones [approximately 360 dollars] to harvest 25 
loads [of corn], which make up an arroba.  To sell here, with the dollar, we’re losing 60 
dollars for every manzana [1.73 acres]. 
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Unable to produce even for their own subsistence at times, many Salvadorans look to the urban 
sector or the U.S. for opportunities to earn a wage. 
Salvadorans who seek work outside of agriculture in El Salvador, however, are rarely 
able to obtain work commensurate with their education or training, if at all. The inadequacy or 
absence of labor markets throughout much of the country means that many Salvadorans are 
alienated even from indirect means of accessing the means of production and earning wages to 
survive.  In the departments where Yucuaiquín and Masahuat are located, only 47.5 and 55.3 
percent of those counted as being employed actually receive formal wages for their work, 
respectively (DIGESTYC, 2008: 20).  Many who are paid receive less than the “minimum wage” 
of $152 per month, or about $6 per a day. Nationally, at least half of the Salvadoran population 
works in the informal sector, alienated from the usual protections of society and law.  Earnings 
of 4 to 5 dollars per day, typical for this sector, are insufficient to meet the true costs of living in 
El Salvador.  Whereas the Salvadoran Census Bureau (DIGESTYC, 2008) estimates that the 
basic food basket (not including utilities) costs $159 per month, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture estimates that the average Salvadoran household in fact needs $300 to cover basics if 
you include utilities, which were recently privatized and have become more expensive (Rosen 
and Meade, 2001; Anner, 2011: 29). 
Mateo: Because a labor market doesn’t exist, we know we’re going to suffer if we don’t 
think about going [migrating]. This is frustrating... We look for work with banks—walking 
around trying to sell credit cards or offering commercial loans to business people in the city.  
That’s it (emphasis added).  
Silvia: In this country, we are going from bad to worse. We can’t find work, and when we do, 
we are exploited so badly, you can’t imagine.  For example, [where I work now], …in 
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addition to our regular duties in the store, we have to baby sit for our bosses’ children, wash 
their dishes, everything. And they send us to eat in the bathroom. In the bathroom!...We start 
at seven in the morning and leave at five, but from November to January, we have to start at 
six in the morning and leave at seven in the evening. And for this wage [5 dollars per day]; 
they aren’t going to pay us any more. I have a friend who left. She worked for two weeks, 
and do you know how much they paid her? Thirteen dollars and 27 cents. Not even enough to 
cover her bus ride!…All jobs are like this. There is no other work… It’s hard.  Out of 
necessity, pure necessity, we have to sacrifice our honor (emphasis added). 
Three forms of alienation are experienced via these processes: First, the response to such 
degradation is felt on a deep emotive level. Second, the absence of jobs renders unprecedented 
educational achievement meaningless and obstructs youths’ human capacity for “free, conscious 
activity”; a capacity that education augments.  And third, such conditions compel many 
Salvadorans to migrate, alienating themselves from family, community, and home.  In Silvia’s 
words: “I graduated [from high school] in 2004.  Many of my classmates…left… Oftentimes 
parents will give them money so that they can migrate.  It’s as if giving them money to migrate is 
an inheritance.  They leave this sort of inheritance so that their children can get ahead in life” 
(emphasis added).  Migration, for most, thus seems like the only choice for a “future,” for a 
“family,” for a “life.”  Yet, crucially, most Salvadorans want to work locally, and would prefer to 
do so—without migrating.   
Salvadorans who migrate to the U.S. without authorization (El Salvador ranks second, behind 
Mexico, as a source country for unauthorized migrants to the U.S. (United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Service, USCIS, 2009)), who are thus alienated from the rights usually granted to 
“citizens” or “legal” residents, generally spend between $7,000 and $10,000 dollars on their 
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journey (nearly ten times the average annual national income) and collectively send billions of 
dollars of remittances to family and friends in El Salvador (some of which is to repay loans that 
facilitate migration).  Rather than constituting “collective” forms of foreign aid or exchange 
(Taylor 2006; Taylor et al., 1999; Durand, Parrado and Massey 1996), these remittances are in 
fact statistical aggregates of individual income transfers between relatives, or, private income 
meant to support families.  As Hernández and Coutin (2006: 191; see also Faist, 2008, for a 
variant on this point) argue, “comparing remittances to foreign aid elevates these exchanges to 
the level of state transactions, and permits governments to claim credit for generating 
remittances.”  The decision to migrate is made out of desperation, simply to “survive,” and in 
spite of great risks.  Yet even such acts are – through official language and accounting practices 
– ideologically “appropriated” and thus “estranged” from the “agency” of migrants themselves.  
The language of “exporting people” in order to “capture remittances” and “leverage 
development” while “relieving” an ‘overburdened’ economy of “surplus labor” (Gammage 2006: 
75, 76, 93) obscures the underlying reality that economic elites seek to legitimize the seizure of 
portions of citizens’ private income, differentiated from ordinary income in that they happen to 
flow across national borders, and that the maximization of such seizures is justified as a matter of 
“economic” and “development policy,” when it in fact supports elite interests at the expense of 
Salvadorans wanting a life for themselves and their families in El Salvador.  Even critical 
scholars such as Robinson (2003:203-4) fall into the trap of employing such language as the 
“export” and “import” of labor and, in fact, risk normalizing such processes through an emphasis 
on the “systemic” logic of “global” or “transnational capitalism.”  Such distortions prevail with 
regard to the recent dollarization of the national economy, as well. 
DOLLARIZATION BEHIND THEIR BACKS 
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In the 1990s, the Salvadoran state, now reflecting the ruling class’s growing interests in 
the financial sector, saw the expansion of migrant remittances as an opportunity to aggressively 
liberalize the economy (Segovia, 2002; Wood and Segovia, 1995: 2081).  By the late 1990s 
remittances reached record levels (and today are valued at close to 3 billion dollars, annually).  
While previously cast in a positive light, policy makers now argued that the volume of 
remittances aggravated currency inflation and El Salvador’s trade deficit (Towers and Borzutzky, 
2004).  In November of 2000, in the midst of earthquakes that killed dozens of people and 
interrupted mass protests, the Flores (ARENA) administration passed a motion to adopt the U.S. 
dollar as the national currency (Towers and Borzutzky, 2004).  The financial (banking) and 
manufacturing sectors, represented by the Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada en El 
Salvador (National Association of Private Entrepreneurs, or ANEP) – whose interests were 
defended by ARENA and, more specifically, the Flores administration – argued that dollarization 
would control inflation, lower interest rates, promote foreign investment, and diminish 
transaction costs in international trade (Towers and Borzutzky, 2004: 29).   
Yet as Towers and Borzutzky (2004) demonstrate, the overall costs of dollarization seem 
to outweigh the benefits. Inflation was already well under control, the U.S. was already a favored 
trading partner with El Salvador, and loans were only available to El Salvador’s wealthiest 
citizens, excluding the majority of Salvadorans trapped in the informal economy.  Adopting the 
dollar would also mean adopting, or simply being subject to, U.S. monetary policy, thus 
eliminating an important domestic mechanism of economic control, including the state’s ability 
to promote exports through currency devaluation and to adjust the circulation of money in times 
of crisis (Towers and Borzutzky, 2004).  Instead of controlling inflation, dollarization ultimately 
resulted in inflated costs of goods, the bulk of which were passed on to the average Salvadoran.  
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Further, as a result of dollarization, the state would lose the money it previously made minting its 
own currency, and it would now have to buy currency from the U.S. 
Why, then, would the state implement such policies? Dollarization assured the banking 
sector that it would be buffered against “the risk that its payments would increase from possible 
[currency] devaluation decided by the political circles” (Proceso, 2002: 8 in Towers and 
Borzutzky, 2004: 34).  By successfully dollarizing the economy, the Flores administration 
effectively guaranteed that—regardless of who controlled the government—economic policy 
would favor the financial sector.  Since dollarization ultimately eliminated the state’s ability to 
promote trade through domestic monetary practices, the argument that dollarization was 
necessary to close the trade deficit seems like a guise. Through dollarization, the viability of 
export trade policy was risked to benefit the increasingly transnational financial sector (what we 
call the new “finance aristocracy”); the advantages of being able to control exchange rates were 
traded for short-term gains in capital markets (Towers and Borzutzky, 2004).  In addition, 
dollarization “allows banks in El Salvador to acquire U.S. dollars at comparatively low interest 
rates and loan them to the rest of Central America;” from 2000 to 2006, these banks increased 
their loans to non-residents by 540 percent (Madrid, 2009: 201). 
By contrast, for the 45.5 percent of Salvadorans living under the official poverty line in 
El Salvador (Segovia, 2005: 52), adoption of the U.S. dollar often means inflation in the cost of 
goods, especially in the informal, unregulated sector where most of the economically active 
population works and consumes (Towers and Borzutzky, 2004: 32; Gammage, 2006).  Whereas 
in the formal market, price regulations exist to limit rounding up when prices in colones are 
translated into dollars, in the informal market, no such regulations exist.  Thus, “in the informal 
market, where the poor operate, …vendors have often set prices in dollars much higher than 
 17
what they were charging in colones…. Even when the conversion is done correctly and the prices 
in dollars are set at the next cent, the poor often buy in very small quantities, creating a greater 
inflationary effect” (Towers and Borzutzky, 2004: 48).  
For the many Salvadorans who are living on $5 dollars or less per day, even a few cents 
can make a great difference.  In interviews, both Yucuaiquenses and Masahueños 
overwhelmingly argued that dollars diminish their spending power while the prices of privatized 
utilities, services, and imported consumer goods are rising (anywhere from 33 to 221 percent 
since 1998) (Towers and Borzutzky, 2004: 32; Medrano, 2002). In only one case did an 
informant put a positive spin on dollarization, and this exception illustrates the general idea: As a 
member of one of Masahuat’s oldest landowning (and therefore wealthier) families, this 
informant credited dollarization with reducing interests on loans, which he used to develop his 
transportation and retail businesses.  Such credit, however, is unavailable to the vast majority of 
Masahueños:  
Florencia: It’s very difficult in El Salvador now because we have the dollar—we buy in 
dollars but we don’t earn in dollars [costs of goods are rounded up while wages are rounded 
down].  Life is very expensive. 
MAQUILAS AND SO-CALLED “FREE TRADE” AGREEMENTS 
Maquilas, touted as a panacea for Salvadoran employment, have failed to deliver.  
According to Madrid (2009: 190, 198), although the recent Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) would purportedly “bestow new economic opportunities for Central 
America through free trade” and maquila-based production, it instead had “devastating effects on 
El Salvador’s productive structure.”  Proponents of the Agreement argued that it would help 
develop and protect local manufacturing by providing enhanced access to North American 
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markets.  However, rather than stimulating local industry and agriculture through liberalized 
trade, the real thrust of the Agreement was to provide a “‘bill of rights’ for the protection of 
transnational capital” (Madrid, 2009: 198; c.f. Moreno, 2004).  CAFTA-DR preserved 
asymmetries in production between the U.S. and El Salvador, such that U.S. farmers could 
export more goods with fewer restrictions while most Salvadoran farmers would be put out of 
business, and domestic manufacturing would remain insignificant (Madrid, 2009).  More 
importantly, CAFTA created ‘new opportunities for transnational companies to acquire local 
ones,’ and to do so more securely: ‘In this sense, CAFTA hastened subordination of local 
interests to transnational ones’ (paraphrasing Segovia, 2005: 82).   
In the years leading up to CAFTA’s ratification in 2004, El Salvador privatized banking, 
energy, telecommunications, and transportation (Segovia, 2002, 2005).  Shortly thereafter, 
Salvadoran elites sold interests in these sectors to foreign capital (the U.S. accounting for 
roughly 67 percent of foreign direct investment in El Salvador):  Simultaneously, these 
Salvadoran elites (including the Palomo Meza, Meza Ayau, Baldocchi-Duenas, Kriete, Bahaia, 
Cristiani, De Sola, Quiroz, and Siman families) bought or expanded interests in the financial and 
commerce sectors of other Central American countries (Segovia 2005: 62-70).  By facilitating 
foreign investment in finance and service sectors throughout the region, CAFTA effectively 
‘weakened national industry, globalized the productive apparatus, subverted the power of the 
state, and shifted the locus of economic power from national to transnational interests and actors’ 
(paraphrasing Segovia, 2006: 81-82).   
Not surprisingly, “CAFTA enthusiasm was strongest in the internationalized segments of the 
business sector” (Spalding, 2007: 89).  Though the FMLN, which opposed CAFTA, held a 
plurality of legislative seats, the combined parties allied under ARENA leadership were 
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sufficient to cancel out the FMLN’s opposition (ibid: 95). Other organizations that sought to 
slow the process to allow more time to research the trade agreement’s likely effects were either 
ignored or excluded as the Flores Administration (ARENA), suspicious of Non-Governmental 
Organizations, limited participation to business and private sector associations.  The most 
vociferous CAFTA opponents thus worked outside the official channels, seeing these as 
hopelessly biased and/or co-opted: Foro Mesoamericano, a transnational activist network 
comprised of activists and organizations from countries throughout the region, opted for acts of 
civil disobedience to obstruct cross-border trade and publicly protest the social and 
environmental destruction neoliberal policies, including CAFTA, unleashed (ibid: 95-101).  In a 
dramatic move, Foro occupied the Salvadoran legislative assembly in an effort to stop fast-track 
ratification of the Agreement, but instead inadvertently hastened it: “Reportedly fearing an 
imminent anti-CAFTA mass mobilization…, [legislative leaders] introduced CAFTA to the 
agenda at 3:00 A.M. and had it approved before the closing of the session eight hours later” 
(ibid: 101). Nevertheless, public opinion polls within El Salvador (summarized in Spalding, 
2007: 104, Table 4) show a clear shift in people’s assessment of Free Trade Agreements, with 
the percent seeing them as helping to “combat poverty” steadily shrinking (from 43% in 2003 to 
24.5% in 2006) while the percent seeing them as “generat[ing] more poverty” steadily increased 
(from 28% in 2003 to 50% in 2006).  As Spalding surmises, “This reversal of support levels 
between 2003 and 2006 suggests that the medium-term impact of oppositional forces may be 
more significant than the short-term impact” (Spalding, 2007: 104). 
Ultimately, CAFTA has both reduced tariffs on importation of food staples and failed to 
provide commensurate jobs in industry.  Tariff reductions under CAFTA threatened an estimated 
646,500 jobs in agriculture while providing a maximum of approximately 134,000 in assembly 
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manufacturing (Madrid, 2009: 192; c.f. Equipo Maíz, 2004; Anner, 2011).  Although precise 
figures on maquila employment are unavailable, maquila employment (more than 80 percent 
women) represents less than 10 percent of total employment in El Salvador and provides, at best, 
the minimum wage, covering only 88 percent of the basic food basket (Anner, 2011: 29; Madrid, 
2009: 205; DIGESTYC, 2012: xxxi).  Total employment in the maquilas is thus remarkably 
small given the immense rhetorical weight given to this sector.  In addition, working conditions 
are extremely exploitative and oppressive, wages abysmal, and chances for labor organizing 
severely constrained (Almeida, 2008: 183-184), though not non-existent (see Anner, 2011; 
Armbruster-Sandoval, 2005). Finally, the broader “linkages” to the rest of the economy that 
might stimulate more general economic development are also typically lacking (Robinson, 2003: 
300-1).  
In Masahuat and Yucuaiquín, the maquila sector, per se, was absent; however, in the 
latter community, some people did work in a Spanish tuna cannery.  The company bused 
workers to its facility in a far eastern port; however, the wages were so scant that many 
Yucuaiquenses felt the commute was not worth the effort.  Those who persisted eventually lost 
their jobs as the company departed.   
 Orlando: There were about 40 people working in a factory that wasn’t local—it was from  
Spain.  But…the factory has closed and its personnel were fired because there were some 
international trade agreements and the government made some modifications that called into 
question part of the contract. [The company] said that it was going to leave…It fired 35 
people from here…It fired people from everywhere. So now they are without work.  And the 
majority are single mothers. They have nothing… Now, a few people have gone to work in 
textile or clothing factories, but not here; rather, in San Salvador. Here there is nothing.  Here 
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there is nothing… Those who stay here, there is nowhere to work.  So, we have a crisis here.  
It is a crisis.    
Although residents of these two towns have not organized themselves to protest these 
conditions (perhaps because these sites themselves are relatively disconnected from the “new” El 
Salvador), they view their migration – in part – as a response to them.  Thus the alienating, 
highly exploitative and oppressive conditions of what little work is available, in conjunction with 
the declining viability of agriculture, are so extreme that they lead many Salvadorans to 
voluntarily alienate themselves from home, family, community, and country via migration in 
search of a “better life.”   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A vicious cycle has now emerged in which the ruling class is “capitalizing” on the 
alienation of its own people and their primary response to that alienation; that is, upon migration 
and the remittances it generates.  The interests and sustaining economic relationships of both rich 
and poor are thus increasingly oriented abroad, while both maintain some ties to El Salvador.  At 
the same time, while class relations within the country have largely broken down, the country 
certainly has not become anything approximating a “classless” society.  Instead, inter-class 
relations today span national borders, and the inequality between rich and poor within the 
country is no less, and in some ways quite possibly greater, than before the class-based civil war.  
El Salvador thus exhibits a clear, but disconnected class-hierarchy.   
In the absence of direct class relations (that is, of stable and sufficient labor markets and 
“wage-relations” which would durably connect workers and capitalists), possibilities for class 
struggle are muted as the domestic class “situation” has become especially fragmented and 
diffuse.  This observation is particularly troubling and tragic in the wake of what was in many 
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ways a class-based civil war and the partial victory that the considerable expansion of 
“democracy” through the peace accords entailed.  However, to be included in political society 
while simultaneously and structurally cut off from economic society renders such inclusion 
rather meaningless – this thus constitutes another form of alienation, and reason to leave. 
Although maquilas play a central rhetorical role in justifying the implementation of trade 
rules that supposedly foster greater industrialization in El Salvador, they in fact support the very 
finance and investment interests that diminish a domestic employment base and thus, class 
relations.  Similarly, dollarization, purportedly a strategy to promote domestic development, 
enables the ruling class to attract foreign investment and secure loans through which it can 
further liberalize the economy, at the expense of domestic productive and export capacity, and 
employment.  This undermines the basis through which Salvadoran workers can organize against 
the ruling class, now increasingly transnational and amorphous (as are the migrant workers 
themselves).  However, more fundamentally, these changes constitute the alienation of most 
Salvadorans from the basic conditions of “life” itself, from the realization of the “first premise of 
history” and thus of “making history” within El Salvador, which they still view as their home 
and country. 
Even though labor organizing as a whole has declined in El Salvador, what success has 
occurred seems to increasingly depend on transnational activism (Anner, 2011).  As Almeida’s 
(2008:174-208) account of popular resistance to neoliberal attempts at privatizing health care 
(1999-2003) in El Salvador indicates, broad-based coalitional forms of social movement 
organizations are forming, with transnational linkages, and have enjoyed some success.  
However, that the only successful effort to generate mass-mobilization and resistance to 
neoliberal reforms in El Salvador has been one focused on “health care” is consistent with our 
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emphasis on the conditions of “life” itself as the most fundamental form of alienation.  In 
contrast to more directly class-based employment relations, which fragmented and disappeared 
throughout the country over a span of 10-15 years (the relative absence of such relations for 
many making collective organization and resistance in this sphere difficult at best), health is an 
issue that affects everyone; the privatization of health care would affect the nation as a whole 
(thus offering a more favorable ground for nationwide mobilization and action).  Yet even here 
class aspects emerged in this mobilization as well, as seen in slogans such as “health care is a 
right, not a commodity” and “either pay or die” (Almeida 2008:196, 200). 
The ‘organization of organizations’ that occurred to defeat the privatization of health care 
is instructive (Almeida, 2008):  Whereas Salvadorans have recently organized by sector to 
protest particular aspects of restructuring, including state sector labor unions and associations 
mobilizing against the privatization of telecommunications in the mid-1990s (Almeida, 2008: 
185), our analysis of the combined forces of alienation suggests that more ‘organizations of 
organizations’ will be needed to challenge the transnationalization of local and national 
production, and to restore to Salvadorans the ability to “live” and “make their own history.”  
Since most Salvadorans currently lack the ability to effectively strike—even if employed, there 
are few jobs in which a walk out would have any effect on the new transnational finance 
aristocracy—and consumer boycotts that might affect consumption and services throughout the 
region are difficult to coordinate, we believe that the greatest hope rests in making more 
transparent the many ways in which the Salvadoran elites benefit from the alienation of their 
own people.  As in the case of health care privatization, and the aftermath of CAFTA, the more 
transparent the interests and actions of the elite are, the more evident the connections between 
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forces of alienation (dollarization, liberalization, and migration) are, the more likely Salvadorans 
may be to ‘organize their organizations’ and realize a new, and more humane, reality. 
 25
 
REFERENCES 
Acevedo, Carlos and Deborah Barry, Hermán Rosa  
1995 "El Salvador’s Agricultural Sector: Macroeconomic Policy, Agrarian Change and the 
Environment." World Development 23 (12):  2153-2172. 
Almeida, Paul D. 
2008 Waves of Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925-2005. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
Anner, Mark S. 
2011 Solidarity Transformed: Labor Responses to Globalization and Crisis in Latin America. 
Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. 
Armbruster-Sandoval, Ralph 
2005 Globalization and Cross-Border Labor Solidarity in the Americas: The Anti-Sweatshop 
Movement and the Struggle for Social Justice. New York: Routledge. 
Dirección General de Estadística y Censos/Census Bureau of El Salvador  (DIGESTYC)  
2012, 2008 Retrieved from http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/. 
Dunkerley, James  
1988 Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America.  London and 
New York, NY: Verso. 
Durand, Jorge and Emilio A. Parrado; Douglas S. Massey 
1996 “Migradollars and Development: A Reconsideration of the Mexican Case.” International 
Migration Review 30(2): 423-444. 
Ellacuría, Ignacio 
1991 “Fundamental Human Rights and the Legal and Political Restrictions Placed on Them,” 
 26
pp. 91-104, and “The Challenge of the Poor Majority,” pp. 171-176 in John Hassett and 
Hugh Lacey (eds.) Towards a Society That Serves Its People: The Intellectual Contribution 
of El Salvador’s Murdered Jesuits. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Equipo Maíz 
2004 ¿Cómo Quedó el TLC? Asociación Equipo Maíz. El Salvador. Central America. 
Faist, Thomas 
2008 “Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round of 
the Migration–Development Nexus.” Population, Space and Place 14: 21-42. 
Gammage, Sarah  
2006 "Exporting People and Recruiting Remittances: A Development Strategy for El 
Salvador?" Latin American Perspectives 33: 75-100. 
Gatchell, Charles F., Paavo Monkkonen, Joseph Perman, and Jeremy Rempel 
2005 Apparel Manufacturing in El Salvador: A Post-Quota Strategy for Competitiveness. 
Report prepared for the Department of Public Policy at the University of California, Los 
Angeles and the World Bank Institute.      
Hernández, Éster and Susan Bibler Coutin 
2006 “Remitting subjects: migrants, money and states.” Economy and Society 35 (2):  
185-208. 
Hecht, Susanna B., Susan Kandel, Ileana Gomes, Nelson Cuellar, and Hermán Rosa  
2005 “Globalization, Forest Resurgence, and Environmental Politics in El Salvador." World 
Development 34 (2): 308-323. 
Hirschman, Albert O. 
 27
1970 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hunt, E. K.  
1982 “Marx’s Conception of Human Nature and the Labor Theory of Value.” Review of 
Radical Political Economy 14 (2): 7-25. 
Madrid, Cori 
2009 “El Salvador and the Central American Free Trade Agreement: Consolidation of a 
Transnational Capitalist Class.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 8 (2-
3): 189-210. 
Marx, Karl  
1964 [1844] The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. New York: International 
Publishers. 
1974 [1844] “The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” pp. 279-400 in Karl Marx: 
Early Writings, with an Introduction by L. Colletti. New York: Penguin Books. 
1998 [1945] The German Ideology. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 
2000 [1845-6] “The German Ideology,” pp. 175-208 in David McLellan (ed.) Karl Marx: 
Selected Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2000 [1852] “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” pp. 329-355 in David McLellan 
(ed.) Karl Marx: Selected Writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Medrano, Jaime 
2002 “CDC: tres años de gobierno de Flores con aumentos tarifarios.” Diario Co Latino, July 
Moreno, Raul 
 28
2004 El Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos y Centroamérica: Impactos 
económicos y sociales. Impreso en Ediciones Educativas, Diseño e Impresiones S.A. 
Managua. 
Paige, Jeffery M.  
1997 Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Pedersen, David 
2004 “In the Stream of Money: Contradictions of Migration, Remittances, and Development 
in El Salvador,” pp. 245-262 in Aldo Lauria-Santiago and Leigh Binford (eds.) Landscapes of 
Struggle: Politics, Society, and Community in El Salvador. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg 
Press. 
Portes, Alejandro and Kelly Hoffman 
2003 “Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the Neoliberal 
Era.” Latin American Research Review. 38 (1): 41-82. 
Robinson, William I. 
2003 Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization. London: 
Verso. 
Rosen, Stacey and Birgit Meade  
 2001 Food Security in Central America: An Update. United States Department of Agriculture 
Economic Research Service: Washington, DC. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/GFA/gfa12-01.pdf 
Schmitt, John and William Stanley 
2001 Finance-led development, or Why people are leaving El Salvador. Paper presented to the 
 29
Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC, September. 
Segovia, Alexander 
2005 Integración real y grupos de poder económico en América Central: Implicaciones para el 
desarrollo y la Democracia de la Región. San Jose: Fundación Friedrich Ebert América 
Central.  
2002 Transformación Estructural y Reforma Económica en El Salvador: El Funcionamiento 
Económico de los Noventa y sus Efectos sobre El Crecimiento, la Probreza, y la Distribución 
del Ingreso. Guatemala City: F & G Editores. 
Spalding, Rose J.  
    2007 “Civil Society Engagement in Trade Negotiations: CAFTA Opposition Movements in El  
    Salvador.” Latin American Politics and Society 49 (4): 85-114. 
Taylor, J. Edward 
2006 International Migration and Economic Development. Paper prepared for the 
International Symposium on International Migration and Development, Population Division, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, Turin, Italy: June. 
1999 “The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the 
Migration Process.” International Migration 37(1): 63-88. 
1992. “Remittances and inequality reconsidered: Direct, indirect, and intertemporal effects.” 
Journal of Policy Modeling 14 (2): 187-208. 
Thompson, Ginger 
2005 “Mill Closings Hit Central America Hard.” The New York Times. March 25. 
Towers, Marcia and Silvia Borzutzky  
2004 "The Socioeconomic Implications of Dollarization in El Salvador." Latin American  
 30
Politics and Society 46 (3): 29-54. 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  
2005 Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano, El Salvador 2005: Una Mirada al Nuevo  
Nosotros/El Impacto de la Migraciones (Report on Human Development in El Salvdor: A  
Look at the New Us/The Impact of Migration). San Salvador: UNDP 
2006  Indicadores municipales sobre desarrollo humano y objetivos de desarrollo del milenio,  
El Salvador 2005.  San Salvador: UNDP. 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)  
2009 Immigrant enforcement actions: 2008. Retrieved from  
http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm 
Wood, Elisabeth Jean 
2003 Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wood, Elisabeth and Alexander Segovia  
1995 “Macroeconomic Policy and the Salvadoran Peace Accords.” World Development 23 
(12): 2079-2099. 
 31
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Yucuaiquín, La Unión and Masahuat, Santa Ana, El Salvador (adapted from 
Wikimedia Commons) 
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Figure 2: General Conceptual Model of Dissipated Class Relations and Alienation in El Salvador
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NOTES 
                                                   
i Names are listed in alphabetical order; this is a full collaboration. 
ii Response rates for interviews with randomly selected households (a 15 percent sample in each 
community) were 97.5 percent in Yucuaiquín and 96 percent in Masahuat, yielding a total of 40 
household-interviews in Yucuaiquín and 23 in Masahuat (Masahuat has a denser urban core with 
more people living in fewer houses). The 39 additional interviews were conducted with carefully 
selected informants—including local leaders, youth, and elders (23 in Yucuaiquín and 16 in 
Masahuat). Additional data from archival research and extensive daily field notes enabled 
confirmation of information obtained from interviews. 
iii Totopostes resemble medium-sized pretzels, only they are made of coarsely ground cornmeal. 
iv Corn tortillas stuffed with some combination of cheese, beans, and a local spice called, loroco. 
v Almeida (2008: 193-194, 205-207) documents that ARENA sought loans from these 
institutions and pursued privatization, but he does not connect these processes with migration 
and remitting. 
vi Had the FMLN obtained state power shortly after the war, some of these changes might have 
been blocked or overturned.  However, economic restructuring was already well under way by 
the time of the Peace Accords of 1992, and, over time successive policy changes have become 
increasingly intertwined, both with each other and with the broader political economy of the 
region and the world, making them much more difficult to undo. 
